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Abstract 
The subjective and the objective aspects of probabilities are incorporated in a simple 
duality axiom inspired by observer participation in quantum theory. Transcending the classical 
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1.  Introduction 
 
It is well known that probabilities have a dual character- they may be either subjective 
or objective or may be partly subjective and partly objective [1-6]. Accordingly, the 
corresponding interpretations are called subjective or belief interpretation, objective or 
frequency interpretation and combined or support interpretation respectively. The Bayesian 
approach, in particular, is an attempt to incorporate the subjective probability assignments 
alongside the objective probabilities to give probability theory its much-needed completeness.  
In fact, there have been attempts [7, 8, 9] to interpret the probabilities of quantum theory by 
appealing to Bayesian methods of inference, but never the amplitudes themselves.  The reason 
is that the amplitudes   are inherently   complex quantities violating Kolomogorov's first axiom 
and hence do not qualify to be called probabilities.  Therefore, a satisfactory understanding of 
the Born rule from more fundamental principles is lacking. On the other hand, the phenomenal 
success of quantum theory seems to call for a reappraisal of our primitive classical notion of 
probabilities themselves, to which end proposals like negative (extended) probabilities[10-16] 
and complex (exotic) probabilities [17, 18] have been put forward in the literature to make 
sense of quantum theory. 
 
The dual nature of probabilities is a consequence of the inevitable fact that ‘the best 
that one can do in the case of an unobserved event is to assign probabilities in regard to the 
possible outcomes in keeping with the information that one has about it’. This fundamental fact 
is utilised to propose a duality axiom for probabilities which incorporates both aspects viz. the 
objective facts like frequencies or weights, and the possession (or lack) of subjective knowledge 
of such facts. The subjectivity, as far as it is to be scientifically meaningful, can enter only as the 
vehicle of assignment of probabilities, since a probability is not something out there in the 
objective world- the world that is made up of objectively observed and observable facts only- 
but it is we, the subjects, who make probability assignments for unobserved and unobservable 
events (past, present and future) on the basis of the known facts and thus the probabilities 
serve the purpose of being a measure of our ignorance as well as of our knowledge. To be more 
explicit, the biasedness of a coin, loadedness of a die and the frequency of outcome etc. are 
objective, while the probability assigned to a single outcome is subjective based on the 
knowledge of such objective facts. This is precisely what we term here as the dual nature of 
probability. 
 
Gaiffman [19] rightly points out that the most rational probability assignment must be 
on the basis of the most complete information about the event. This, obviously, is the ‘expert 
assignment’ [20] which is to be adopted by all other subjects in order not to make off-the-track 
assignments. Now, science can be done only with the most complete information about the 
system or event and thus the expert probability is the most suitable one for scientific 
investigations and we shall assume in this work that the subjects are experts who in their 
subjective assignments make use of the maximum information available to anyone anywhere 
upto that instant. This is necessitated by the fact that we need to have testable predictions in 
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science, and not just arbitrary personal guesses based on inadequate knowledge of facts about 
the system or event. It turns out that with this kind of necessary restrictions on the subjective 
probability, we can tackle the dual nature of probabilities to a large extent using the extremely 
simple and most general kind of formulation proposed here.  
 
It will be shown that once we try to incorporate both, the subjective and the objective 
probabilities, we must have fundamentally complex assignments in order not to violate the 
Kolomogorov axioms. Thus, the link with quantum mechanics is very easily established and it 
also paves the way for a fresh interpretation of quantum mechanics itself based on subject-
object participation as envisaged by Wheeler [21] and conforming to von Neumann’s original 
line of reasoning [22].  Recently, Manousakis [23] has attempted to base quantum theory on 
the basis of operations of consciousness and Stapp [24] has investigated the mind-brain 
connection to pinpoint the role of consciousness in the collapse of a quantum state. 
 
In section-2 we propose to tackle the duality of probabilities in the form of an axiom. 
We motivate the need for this duality axiom by a simple analysis of subjectivity and objectivity 
in science. We impose, following common sense, a sanity requirement which requires the 
assigning subject to reflect the objective facts about the event in its subjective assignment. In 
section-3 we discuss the classical prototype in the form of the coin toss and in section-4 the 
quantum prototype in the form of the double slit interference. In section-5 we draw attention 
to the absence of higher order interference effects in experiments and show that the 
formulation proposed here does indeed very naturally explain such absence. Similarly, the 
vanishing of quantum interference in Wheeler’s delayed choice type experiments are also easily 
explained. We conclude in the end with a discussion of the advantages, caveats, and the future 
directions for further development.  
 
2. The Duality Axiom for Probabilities 
 
To motivate the introduction of the Duality Axiom, let’s first discuss subject-object 
duality. For all purposes, we may define as objective that which is common to all subjects at any 
particular instant of time. As an example, Gravitation existed before it became an objective fact 
primarily through the subjective efforts of Newton, while tachyons or magnetic monopoles 
exist only subjectively (as of now), still waiting to be granted objective existence by 
experimental proof.  Please mark how the objective existence depends on the subjective assent 
for its so-called objectivity and, till that moment how it is regarded as mere fiction and not fact, 
no matter how compelling the theoretical arguments for its existence may be. 
 
An event at any instant fails to be objective if there are subjective differences regarding 
it at that instant. In fact, the so called objective world independent of any perceiving subject is 
but an extrapolation on which all subjects agree, thus granting it its objectivity. Even if only one 
subject does not agree, the issue fails to be objective. The objective should obviously have the 
concurrence of every subject. Similarly, the case of ‘no evidence’ means ‘no objective evidence’ 
and ‘symmetric evidence’ means ‘symmetric objective evidence’. Even if just one subject has 
access to some fact about an event, then the ignorance of that fact loses its objectivity. Not 
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only should knowledge be objective but ignorance should also be objective, and this has to be 
taken care of while dealing with the dual aspects of probabilities. If ignorance is not objective 
i.e. common to all subjects, then probabilities will lose their objectivity and subjective 
predictions will be widely (and sometimes wildly) different making them scientifically 
meaningless.  
 
Further, any probability assigned on the basis of insufficient objective knowledge, 
including knowledge of what any other subject might have known about the event, is not a 
dependable assignment and thus falls out of scientific reckoning, unless and until it is modified 
on the basis of more complete information. If nobody knows anything about an event, then 
only we have ‘no evidence’ about that event. If even one person has some information about 
the event, then that information is to be made objective by way of subject-to-subject 
information transfer or by way of repetition of the process of attaining the same, for otherwise 
subjective assignments will vary arbitrarily because of their being made on the basis of unequal 
information. In the absence of any objective evidence whatsoever, the subjective assignment is 
automatically guided by the ‘symmetric evidence’ formula since that is the best that we can do 
subject to subsequent verification. In that case, the subjective assignment of assumed a priori 
equality of the probability of all outcomes determines the objective amplitude.  
 
Let’s now examine how we actually assign a probability. Clearly, we need the following 
five facts for the purpose: 
  
 Knowledge of the particular outcome e, for which the probability is to be assigned  
 Knowledge of the full sample space of all possible outcomes Ω  
 Lack of knowledge of the outcome in case the event has already occurred, otherwise the 
probability assignment becomes trivial i.e. P(e) = 1 or 0, depending on whether it has 
already occurred or not. 
 Knowledge of the statistical frequency f of occurrence of the particular outcome e in 
question  
 In the absence any knowledge whatsoever of the frequencies, allotment of equal a 
priori frequency to all outcomes 
 
This, in itself, is sufficient evidence for the involvement of the knowing subject 
(alongside the objective facts) through the knowledge or lack of it in each step as enlisted 
above in the assignment of a probability, since any knowledge or lack of it is but a matter of 
stored data in the memory of the assigning subject consequent upon the interaction (mostly 
sensory) of the knowing subject with the object in question. The objective sample space, the 
particular objective outcome selected from it, the objective statistical frequency f of the 
outcome etc. all indeed have their subjective counterparts or images in the memory storage, 
which is a sine qua non for the purpose for any perceptual knowledge by comparison/matching 
and, failing which there can never arise any question of assigning a probability. This argument 
firmly establishes that the dual nature of probabilities is not a conjecture but a fact in need of a 
satisfactory formulation. 
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However, the fact that  the subjective  probability for  an event  varies from person  to 
person  renders  any objective  study  of such  assessments meaningless  and this  also acts  as  a 
deterrent  for any  systematic investigation   of  such   arbitrary personal  probabilities.    For 
example, the  subjective probability for a so-called improbable event (objective classical 
probability 0) may  even  be assigned  a  value  1   (subjective certainty)  because  of subjective  
ignorance  of the  said improbability.   In the face of such absurdities, we have to devise ways to 
safeguard the veracity of the objective classical probability based on objective facts while at the 
same time incorporating rational subjective assessments.   
 
To this end, we formulate the following Duality Axiom for probability: 
  
  Duality Axiom:  The probability  P(e) of  an event  E  in a probability space  (Ω, E, P) with 
sample  space Ω, event space  E and  Probability measure  P is a function of both,  the objective  
amplitude Ao  and the  subjective assignment As. 
 
                                               P(e) = (As, Ao)                                                          …    …    …    …     (1) 
 
The subjective and the objective assignments are, in general, independent of each other in 
which case we may write the expression in the simplest possible case as the trivial bilinear:  
 
                                            P(e) = As·Ao                                                           …    …    …    …     (2)  
                      
and, they may be complex numbers as required by the Kolomogorov axioms for the 
probabilities P(e). But, for reasons discussed above we shall have to demand that the subjective 
assignment somehow should reflect the objective amplitude. This is formulated as the sanity 
requirement (see below).  All facts about the system are encoded in the objective amplitude Ao 
which may be calculated from the frequency of the event in a large number of identical trials or 
by solving an equation like the Schrodinger equation as the case may demand, while As is simply 
the expression of the subjective knowledge of the same objective facts. 
 
 We note that  what is known from  classical probability theory  is only the  quantity on the 
left i.e. the probability P(e), which  is the objectively  ascertained (or  ascertainable) probability 
based on  frequencies or statistics and which  satisfies the three  well-known Kolomogorov 
axioms.  As   far as classical   probabilities are concerned, Kolomogorov's axioms suffice, but 
when we enter the quantum arena, our traditional notion of probability fails. Therefore, the 
duality axiom will be useful not only to determine P(e) in terms of subjective and  objective 
assignments  but  also to  tackle the  interpretational problems of both Probability theory and 
of Quantum theory simultaneously.  
   
We shall now determine some of the properties of the assignments by appealing to 
Kolomogorov's axioms. First of all, for simplicity and for the sake of logical consistency, we state 
the sanity requirement: 
 
 sanity requirement : The subjective assignment must reflect the objective amplitude.  
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 This serves to keep out wild and logically untenable subjective assignments made without 
having proper objective information about the system or event in question. Further, here the 
objective amplitude and the subjective assignment both have the identical information content. 
This, of course, makes the conscious subject a somewhat passive assigner, stripped of any free 
will. But, this is a small price to pay in order to safeguard scientific rationality, while at the same 
time including the conscious observer in the scheme.  
 
It is easy to see that with real assignments As, Ao Є R, it is never possible to satisfy all the 
Kolomogorov axioms.  Thus they have to be complex numbers and the sanity requirement then 
fixes the dependence of As on Ao as: 
 
                                            As = Ao*                                                                          …   …   …   … (3) 
 
 Further,  appealing to  Kolomogorov's second axiom  about the unit probability  measure 
on the  measure space (Ω, E,  P) i.e. P(Ω) = 1 we may absorb a possible multiplicative constant 
as a normalization factor  in  the assignments without any loss of generality and write finally : 
 
                                                 P(e) = As · Ao = Ao*· Ao =A
2                                               …   …    …  …  (4) 
  
where, Ao  = As*= A exp(iδ),   A=|As|=|Ao|≥ 0 is their  common magnitude and δ is an arbitrary 
phase. 
 
 To make the correspondence of the probability with the frequency, we may write the 
objective amplitude explicitly as: 
 
                                     Ao = lim N→∞ {√(f/N)}exp(iδ)                                                           …   …   …   (5)  
 
where f is the frequency of the outcome in a very large number of identical trials N.  
 
In classical probability theory, the phase factor will be used only as a guarantor of 
consistency.  For example, if we have mutually independent events 1 and 2 with amplitudes A1 
and A2, we can write the total objective amplitude as Ao = A1·A2 such that the probability of 
both events together becomes P12 = As · Ao = |Ao|
2 = |A1|
2·|A2|
2 = P1·P2, as expected classically.  
 
In quantum mechanical applications, the phase factor will play its usual role as the 
action in Planck units (i.e. δ = S/ℏ) as the correspondence then will be established not through 
eq. (5), but by demanding that the amplitude Ao be the wave function i.e. a solution of the 
Schrodinger equation exactly as in the path integral approach to quantum mechanics.  
 
We shall now apply the formulation to study the prototype classical and quantum 
probabilities which will be sufficient to convince us that the formulation can be applied to all 
other problems without any difficulty.  
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3. Application to classical probability- coin toss 
 
Let’s consider a single toss of the classical coin as a prototype of classical probability.  If 
one knows about the unbiasedness then, on employing  As*= Ao and Ao(h∪t) = Ao(h) + Ao(t) 
=|Ao(h)|exp( iδh) +|Ao(t)|exp(iδt), the total probability of obtaining a head(h) or a tail(t) 
becomes: 
 
        P(Ω) = P(h∪t)=|Ao(h∪t)|
2=|Ao(h)+Ao(t)|
2= P(h) + P(t) + 2|Ao (h)||Ao (t)|Cos(δh - δt)        … (6) 
 
It is obvious that the mutually exclusive outcomes of an event may, in general, be taken 
to represent the orthogonal basis vectors (here |h> and |t>) of a Hilbert space spanned by 
them with the amplitudes providing the coefficients just as in quantum mechanics. Classically, 
however, the interference term vanishes because of the fact that the two states |h> and |t> 
have no possibility of simultaneous occurrence i.e.  P(h∩t) = 0. This ‘classical orthogonality’ (i.e. 
mutual exclusivity or disjointedness) of the final states makes any quantum-like superposition 
impossible and meaningless for a thin coin and fixes the value of the relative phase i.e.  Cos (δh 
— δt) = cos (π/2) = 0 for all times, so that we have the familiar classical result reproduced: 
 
                            P(h∪t) = P(h) + P(t) = 1                                                              …    …    …    (7) 
 
For a thick coin discussed in detail by  Yong and Mahadevan [25], however, we would 
have a finite probability for it to land on the sides so that eq.(4) is to be replaced by P(h∪t∪s) = 
P(h) + P(t) + P(s) = 1, with the condition that the outcomes are pair-wise disjoint i.e.   δh — δt = 
δt — δs = δs — δh =  π/2.                                                                                                                       
 
In general, a  random classical event with n  possible outcomes can be represented  by  
an n-dimensional  Hilbert  space  with the  objective assignments Ao(i) along the  n orthogonal 
coordinates such that the relative  phases   satisfy  the   time-independent pair-wise  disjoint  
condition viz. cos(δi - δj) = cos(π/2)=0 always,  for all i ≠j,  such that P(Ω) = Σj P(j) = 1   is  satisfied.    
In  this   kind of Hilbert  space-like description  of   the  classical  event,   the subjective  
assignments As(i) = Ao(i)*  span  the  dual  Hilbert space.    
 
Classically, as far as the probabilities of  the outcomes are concerned, superposition of 
the assignments fails to  be effective in producing any interference effects because of  the fact  
that each classical outcome  entails necessarily a measurement which destroys all interference 
by projecting it along  any one  of the  coordinates(basis vectors). It  is only  in Quantum theory  
that the relative phases  have observable consequences because  of  quantum interference   as  
in  the  famous  double  slit experiment. Nevertheless,  we  have succeeded  in reformulating 
probability theory taking  into account  the  subjectivity of  probabilities  as an equally 
important factor  alongside the  objectivity  in  determining the probability.   
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Now, as a precursor to the application to quantum theory for a final vindication of the 
dual nature of probabilities we shall briefly discuss further the coin toss in regard to possible 
quantum effects in light of the present approach.  
 
When the coin is tossed, it has two possibilities of landing and the assigner has also the 
images of these two possibilities in his mind when he tries to call. We assume the objective and 
the subjective possibilities to be unbiased and independent of each other. There are four 
possible outcomes in all, namely, h*h, h*t, t*h and t*t, where the first one is the subjective 
assignment and the second one is the objective outcome. The probability of a correct guess is 
clearly ½, which is also the probability of a wrong guess.  The subjective ‘call’ will tally with the 
objective ‘fall’ only half the time and this is how the probability is actually and operationally 
assigned by the caller to the outcomes h or t! 
 
Only after the caller physically comes to know the state (h or t) after the toss, does the 
doubt in the mind vanish, giving rise to the observed state and not before that. Thus, “It is the 
subjective doubt that we have been objectively describing as a superposition in quantum 
mechanics, and, as already mentioned earlier, this objectivity surely results from the unanimity 
about the same doubt shared by all subjects involved”. This is the von Neumann subjective state 
collapse, which again gets an objective status when the same knowledge of the state of the 
coin (h or t) becomes common to all subjects involved. The so-called observer-independence of 
the classical world of objective science is thus only an assumption and not a final fact and is 
certainly not true in quantum mechanics. 
 
 4. Application to quantum probability- double slit interference 
 
In  the traditional  as  well as  other  proposed interpretations,  the double  slit   
experiment  acquires  a  central   place, both, for its simplicity and profundity.  While the 
interference effects for multiple quanta are explicable parallel to the classical wave mechanical 
treatment, the quantum interference observed- even when only a single quantum is allowed at 
a time to transit from the source to the screen- is certainly not explicable without recourse to 
the possibility of its simultaneous transit through both slits contrary to its particle nature.  
 
Let's now consider the double slit experiment with single quantum in light of the duality 
axiom and see its interpretational advantages.  Assume that a source ‘s’ emits the quanta which 
travel through the slits 1  and 2 and interfere at position y on the screen. The objective 
assignment for the process will be the sum of the two mutually exclusive amplitudes Ao = A1 + 
A2 and consequently, by the sanity requirement the subjective assignment is As = Ao*. The 
probability of arrival at y is then 
 
                           P(y) = As . Ao=|Ao|
2=|A1|
2+|A2|
2+ A1*A2 + A2*A1                            …   …    … (8) 
 
For each quantum if we write the objective assignments A1,2 for passage through slits 
1(2) as  a product of the independent amplitudes to go from s to 1(2) and then from 1(2) to y, 
then the arrival probability  P(y) becomes: 
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  P(y) = |<y|1> <1|s> + <y|2> <2|s>|2 = <s|1> <1|y> <y|1> <1|s> + <s|2> <2|y> <y|2> <2|s>  
                                                          + <s|1> <1|y> <y|2> <2|s> + <s|2><2|y><y|1><1|s>        …   (9)   
                                                             
It is seen that each of the four terms is a product of the subjective and the objective 
assignments (here amplitudes) in keeping with the duality axiom.  But,  the  noteworthy feature 
is that ``the  interference arises  not from  an actual passage of  the single quantum through 
both  slits simultaneously but through  the  interplay  of  the subjective  assignment  for  its 
passage  through one  slit with the  objective amplitude for passage through  the  other'' as 
evidenced by the structure of the last two terms . In the  interference  region  the actual or 
objective passage through slit  1 is  taken in conjunction  with the  assumed(subjective) 
assignment (due to lack of which-slit knowledge) for passage through slit  2 and vice versa.  
These two interference terms combined together as two mutually exclusive ways of realising 
the interference at the point y give a real positive probability: 
 
 P(1∩2) = A1*A2 + A2*A1 = 2|A1||A2|cos δ, (δ = δ2 — δ1 = phase difference )       …   (10) 
 
This follows from the application of the Kolomogorov axiom regarding P(A∪B) and comparing it 
with eq.(6) as  follows: 
 
                          P(y) = P(1∪2) = P(1) + P(2) ⎯ P(1∩2)  
 
                                  = [P(1 only) + P(1∩2)]+ [P(2 only) + P(1∩ 2)] ⎯ P(1∩2)  
or,                     
                                P(1∪2) = P(1 only) + P(2 only) + P(1∩2)                                          …    …     …   (11) 
 
This is to be contrasted with the non-classical total probability formula proposed 
recently by Khrennikov [26] on the basis of stochastic modelling.  Also note that P(1 only) and 
P(2 only) are the respective probabilities for passage through slits 1 only & 2 only when both 
slits are open:  
 
                     P(1,2 only) = P(1,2)|both open  = P(1,2)|2,1 closed ⎯ P(1∩2)                          …   …   …   (12) 
                                                 
Classically, because of mutual exclusivity, the quantity P(1) should not depend on 
whether we have slit 2 open or closed. But, quantum mechanically we have eq. (9) which tells 
us that when both slits are open we have no way to tell which path exactly was taken by the 
quantum. This is because the exclusivity is now at the level of the more fundamental 
amplitudes rather than at the level of probabilities. The peculiarity of the quantum interference 
effects is that while the final probability and the single path probabilities are always non-
negative, the interference probability P(1∩2) given by eq. (10) may be positive, negative or zero 
depending on the relative phase δ.  
 
10 
 
Now, as discussed in the coin toss example above in section-3, it again turns out that the 
probabilities reside as much in the subjective lack of knowledge as in the objective event or 
the outcome.  
 
In the interpretation proposed here, we may assign path 1 when it has arrived through 
1, path 2 when it has arrived through 2, path 1 when it has arrived through 2 and path 2 when it 
has arrived through 1.  These four possibilities constitute the four terms in eq. (9) above which 
are simple and self-explanatory as depicted in the following figures in the order in which they 
appear.   
  
               
 
 
 
 Please note that Soucek[18] has also proposed similar interpretative diagrams 
treating the amplitudes themselves as complex probabilities, while in Cramer’s transactional 
interpretation [27] the backward arrows from arrival point y to the source s represent the 
advanced echoes which confirm the transaction in each case. 
 
5. Absence of multi-order interference and the delayed-choice experiment 
 
 We now discuss the important issue of the absence of higher order interference effects 
[28] i.e. interference due to simultaneous passage of the quantum through three or more slits. 
If we assume, as is traditionally done, that the double-slit interference occurs due to 
simultaneous passage of the quantum through both slits, there is no reason why there should 
not be higher order interference effects due to similar simultaneous passage through three or 
more slits. In fact, between slits 1 and 2 shown in the above figures, we can always cut more 
slits and such higher interference must be expected to occur quite naturally. However, this is 
not supported by experiments as shown by Sinha et al [29], while there is nothing in quantum 
s
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theory itself or in any of its interpretations proposed so far, which would rule out such third and 
higher order interference effects.  
 
In our formalism, for an N-slit interference, the arrival probability will be given by only 
sum over pair-wise terms including self pairs (i=j): 
 
P(y)=Σi,j Ai*Aj = Σi,j  (<s|i> <i|y>) (<y|j> <j|s>)                                                       …   …   …   (13) 
 
where i and j are the slit indices running from 1 to N corresponding to the subjectively assigned 
and the objectively traversed paths respectively. Since the common sense observation that a 
quantum can pass only through only one slit at a time is restored in this formulation we 
automatically come to the conclusion that the subjective doubt also will be about its passage 
through only one slit at a time.  This leads to only two-slit interference terms as in eq. (13) 
above. 
 
 Similarly, another example which is directly related to the role of the observer in 
quantum theory is the celebrated delayed choice experiment proposed by Wheeler [21] and 
experimentally tested by Jacques et al [30] as proof of the complementarity principle of Bohr 
that the wave or particle behavior of a quantum depends on the type of experiment the 
observer chooses to perform. The idea is to get the which-slit information long after the 
quantum has passed the slit region, and possibly interfered with itself in the screen region, 
before being detected by either or both of a pair of detectors D1 and D2 placed facing pointedly 
at slits 1 and 2 respectively such that if one of them clicks it means that the quantum passed 
through the corresponding slit and not through the other. It turned out that the wave nature 
(and hence the interference pattern) vanished when the which-path information (and hence 
particle nature) was ascertained by detection.  
 
 Now, in our dualistic formulation, when the arrival point y is replaced by detector D1 or 
D2, only one of the first two terms in eq.(9) contributes. The interference terms vanish when 
such detectors are placed as would allow incoming quanta only from the corresponding slit. 
This is because in such a case only one of the two terms, P1 = (<s|1> <1|D1>) (<D1|1> <1|s>)   
and   P2 = (<s|2> <2|D2>) (<D2|2> <2|s>), is realised and it explains the result quite simply. The 
knowledge of the observer (from the very way in which the experiment is designed by her) 
leads to the fact of her discarding interference terms and to the fact that there will be no 
interference and that only one of the detectors will click. Thus, when the screen is replaced by 
the detectors, it is not a surprise that interference (wave nature) is not observed in delayed-
choice type experiments, since it is expected not to occur.  
 
 Note however that in our scheme, when the detectors are in place, the total probability 
P is the sum of the disjoint probabilities P1 and P2, and unless and until the detectors are 
examined as to which one clicked, the which-path information is not obtained although the 
quantum interference is lost. Then the situation reduces to the classical coin-toss as discussed 
in section-3.  
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
    The main idea is that the dual nature of probabilities is a fact which can no longer be 
avoided or postponed. Rather, it is the primary issue to be tackled if we wish to remove 
quantum weirdness and restore common sense in quantum theory.  That quantum mechanics 
could be interpreted probabilistically means that probabilities also share, at least to some 
extent, the same uncommon features with the former [31]. A little reflection reveals that one of 
these commonalities has to be the involvement of the conscious observer, though its 
incorporation is rather difficult and has found stiff opposition in both the fields. More than 
anything else, this is primarily because of our inability to comprehend and mathematically 
represent consciousness and its operations in a rational scientific manner. However, as shown 
in this work we can very simply incorporate the conscious observer into the probability theory 
through the duality axiom. Simplicity (duality axiom) and common sense (sanity requirement) 
have been the guiding principles in the present work and, we have successfully implemented 
the scheme in case of both classical as well as quantum probabilities. 
 
 It is demonstrated that in place  of the familiar classical probability  P(e), we may  as well 
work with  the more fundamental assignments which obviously  hold up a  promise not  only to 
unify all  the interpretations  (belief, frequency  and support  interpretations) of probability  via  
the Duality axiom but  also for a fundamental  new  interpretation of  Quantum  mechanics 
treating the  observer(subject) on par with the observed(object) as envisaged by Wheeler in his 
participatory universe scenario. The interpretation along with its implications for various 
curious quantum phenomena like wave-particle duality, delayed choice experiments and non-
locality etc. will be treated in a forthcoming paper by the author [32]. 
 
 Several caveats in the formulation are also in order for being addressed. First of all, the 
addition of mutually exclusive amplitudes is taken straightaway from quantum theory without 
sufficient reason. ‘Why should the mutually exclusive quantum amplitudes add just like 
mutually exclusive classical probabilities, if not for matching with experimental findings?’- is the 
moot question still persisting. The only way out seems to appeal to common sense to justify the 
procedure that when a number of mutually exclusive alternatives are available for an outcome, 
the total amplitude for it is the sum of the amplitudes for individual alternatives a la classical 
probabilities. The classical exclusivity is lost as we go beneath the classical probabilities and it 
appears now at the level of the amplitudes for the alternatives (paths in the double slit 
example), and therefore, we add the amplitudes for them to get the total amplitude and then 
move on to find the probability by multiplying with the subjective assignment which is the 
complex conjugate of the total amplitude. Further, while the amplitudes are mutually exclusive 
the probabilities are not, as shown by eq. (12). 
 
 Another intriguing fact is that the interference term P(1∩2) given by eq. (10) can 
take up all real values including negative ones. This somehow jeopardizes our attempt to 
establish a correspondence with the third axiom of Kolomogorov. It is at this point that the 
classical axiom of positive probabilities is to be extended to include negative values as well. This 
leads to the extended probabilities. Similarly, the fact that the last two terms of eq. (9) are 
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complex leads one to exotic or complex probabilities if we want to treat both these as 
probabilities on par with the first two terms. This is the proof of the richness of the possible 
extensions of traditional classical probabilities offered by the formalism in keeping with 
quantum theory. 
 
 However, the advantages of the formalism clearly far outweigh the disadvantages in the 
sense that it paves the way for a simple, logical and straightforward incorporation of the 
conscious subject in probability theory as well as in quantum theory. In our attempt to 
understand the Born rule from a deeper standpoint once we accept the duality axiom, 
everything falls in place and the objections based on classical notions of probability seem rather 
superficial. On the other hand, we may very well look ahead and relax the simplicity criterion by 
going for more complicated bilinear functional dependences of the probability on As and Ao, 
while still respecting one or more of Kolomogorov’s axioms. We may also make the assigning 
subject active rather than passive so that she can influence the objective amplitude Ao, and also 
the probability, by her subjective assignment As. These will certainly be issues of great 
importance and interest to scientists in both the fields in the future. 
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